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Comments 
To be considered  for publication in the Comments 
section, letters  should be relatively  short-generally 
fewer than 1,000  words-and  should be sent to the 
journal offices  at the  address  appearing  inside  the  front 
cover. The editors will choose which letters  will be 
published.  All published  letters  will be  subject  to editing 
for style  and length. 
Evaluating Public Goods  and 
Regulations 
Louis Kaplow's recent paper, "On the (Ir)Rel- 
evance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distor- 
tion to Government Policy" (Fall 2004, pp. 159- 
176),  begins by offering  a new approach  to the 
evaluation  of  potential  public  goods  and  envi- 
ronmental  regulations. Providing a public good 
or improving environmental quality has distribu- 
tional effects both from the benefits of the pub- 
lic good or improved environment  and from the 
cost of providing that benefit.  Kaplow's new ap- 
proach  "neutralizes" these  distributional effects 
via offsetting tax changes and then checks to see 
whether the  "neutralized" version  of the  policy 
yields an efficiency gain. We believe that this new 
approach is a major advance for the evaluation 
of government  policy. 
However, Kaplow goes on to argue that under 
this approach  there is no  need  to consider  dis- 
tributional  effects  or  pre-existing  labor  supply 
distortions: simple first-best  benefit-cost rules ap- 
ply. We strongly dispute  this claim. Under  the 
particular functional  form the paper assumes- 
where leisure  is separable  in  utility from  both 
private  consumption and government spending-- 
second-best  considerations  are  indeed  irrele- 
vant, because the effect of distributional consid- 
erations exactly offsets that of labor supply dis- 
tortions.  However,  under  an  equally  or  more 
plausible functional  form  for utility-in  which 
government  spending  is separable from leisure 
and  consumption-the  second-best  principles 
for policy evaluation remain largely unchanged 
from those shown in the public economics  liter- 
ature  over  the  last  three  or  four  decades.  In- 
deed,  when  willingness  to  pay  for  the  public 
good is proportional to income,  the distribution- 
neutral approach yields exactly  the  same  results as 
does  prior work. And in  more  general  circum- 
stances,  without  any restrictions  on  the  utility 
function,  distributional  considerations  and  la- 
bor  supply distortions  remain  crucial to policy 
evaluation  under  the  distribution-neutral crite- 
rion  (see Williams, 2005). 
Thus, Kaplow has offered an original and im- 
portant  approach  for  evaluating  government 
policy.  But  under  this  approach,  distribution 
and  labor  supply  distortions  generally  remain 
highly relevant. 
Lawrence H. Goulder 
Stanford University 
Stanford, California 
Ian W.H. Parry 
Resources For the Future 
Washington, D.C. 
Roberton  C. Williams III 
University of Texas at Austin 
Austin, Texas 
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Response  from Louis Kaplow 
The  thesis of my article is that traditional first- 
best principles, like the Samuelson cost-benefit test 
and Pigou's injunction to internalize externalities, 234  Journal of Economic  Perspectives 
provide good  benchmarks for policy analysis de- 
spite concerns about distribution  and labor supply 
distortion advanced in extensive literatures. The 
reason  is  that it  is  possible  to  implement  such 
government policies in a distribution-neutral  fash- 
tion, which  in a basic setting holds  both  distri- 
bution  and  labor supply constant.  I appreciate 
Goulder,  Parry and  Williams's kind  words  re- 
garding  the  importance  of  my  proposed 
distribution-neutral approach. 
Goulder, Parry  and Williams suggest, however, 
that my claim must be qualified if one alters my 
base-case assumption regarding separability. But 
I  offered  an  extensive  discussion  of  qualifica- 
tions  (pp.  166-168)  that begins  by addressing 
this very assumption. As I explain there, this and 
other  caveats are  essentially orthogonal  to  the 
literature's two main arguments. The  necessary 
adjustments  to  first-best prescriptions  depend 
on different factors and, a priori, are as likely to 
be in the opposite  direction from what is called 
for in prior work. Thus, their assertion that the 
literature's  prescriptions  "remain  largely  un- 
changed" is incorrect. 
Moreover, in  reviewing that work  (pp.  168- 
171),  I show that the  primary source  of distor- 
tion  in  the  second-best  literature  on  public 
goods  and regulation  is an implicit increase  in 
redistribution. That is, the literature's policy ex- 
periments  typically build  in  greater  redistribu- 
tion;  the  resulting  distortion  is  highlighted 
whereas  the  welfare  effect  of  redistribution  is 
ignored.  One of my examples  of this phenome- 
non  (n.  8)  involves the  very case  of  separable 
public  goods  that Goulder,  Parry and Williams 
emphasize.  This depiction  is reinforced  by the 
single instance they identify where prior models 
would yield  the  same result as my distribution- 
neutral approach, for it is precisely the  case in 
which  the  underlying  policy  experiment  hap- 
pens  to be distribution-neutral. 
Finally, as a matter  of  logic,  Goulder,  Parry 
and Williams's introduction  of public goods sep- 
arability cannot  upset my argument. Such sepa- 
rability is not inconsistent  with the weak leisure 
separability used in my benchmark case (as n. 8 
indicates).  Also  (as n. 2 mentions),  my result is 
proved in Kaplow (1996)  for the case with both 
types of separability (as well as in a more general 
setting). 
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